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I. Introduction: The PRA Proposal 
In 2003, the Bush administration proposed establishing Personal Reemployment 
Accounts (PRAs) to assist unemployed individuals seeking work.1  The program would 
not replace unemployment insurance (UI) but would provide resources to assist 
unemployed individuals in the transition between jobs.  The program would also use 
reemployment bonuses as an incentive for those seeking work to obtain employment 
more quickly.  Under the program, UI recipients who meet certain criteria would be 
eligible for accounts of up to $3,000 to be used for job training, work search, and other 
                                                 
1 David Leonhardt, How to Give Job Seekers a Tastier Carrot, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2003, at C4. 
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reemployment services (to be administered by state One-Stop Career Centers).  
Recipients would have 12 months to use the accounts.  Those recipients who find jobs 
within 13 weeks would be permitted to keep the remaining balance in their accounts as a 
reemployment bonus.  Sixty percent of this balance would be payable immediately, with 
the remaining forty percent payable after six months of employment. 
States would receive funds from the federal government to establish the accounts, 
but the amount of the individual accounts would be left to the discretion of each state 
administering the program.  States would also make the ultimate determination of which 
current UI recipients would receive PRAs.  Federal law already requires states to evaluate 
claimants as they enter the UI system and predict which UI recipients are most likely to 
exhaust their benefits before finding a job (and thus remain unemployed for a longer 
period of time).2  Such recipients would be eligible to receive PRAs.  However, since 
states establish their own guidelines in determining who is most likely to exhaust 
benefits,3 the federal government would be leaving the ultimate decision regarding who 
receives a PRA in the hands of the individual states. 
                                                 
2 Paul T. Decker, Work Incentives and Disincentives, in UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS OF POLICY ISSUES 285, 308 (Christopher J. O’Leary & Stephen A. 
Wandner eds., 1997).  In determining which UI recipients would be eligible for PRAs, program 
administrators would rely on Worker Profiling and Reemployment Service (WPRS) systems that are 
already in place to determine which UI recipients are most likely to exhaust their benefits:   
Recent legislation (the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993) has addressed this 
issue by requiring states to implement systems, called Worker Profiling and Reemployment 
Service (WPRS) systems, to identify permanently dislocated claimants expected to experience 
long spells of unemployment and to provide them with mandatory job search assistance services.  
One of the primary objectives of the WPRS initiative is to coordinate the provision of services 
from different employment and training agencies so that claimants will have better information 
about the opportunities for participating in training and other reemployment services.   
Walter Corson & Paul T. Decker, Using the Unemployment Insurance System to Target Services to 
Dislocated Workers, in LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT POLICIES, 3, 4 
(Laurie J. Bassi & Stephen A. Woodbury eds., 2000). 
3 EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, Personal 
Reemployment Accounts: President Bush Takes Action to Help Unemployed Americans Get Back to Work 
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The original Bush administration proposal would have given states $3.6 billion 
over two years to establish PRAs.  However, Congress did not approve the proposal in 
2003.4  In 2004, the House gave approval for a PRA pilot program.5  Permissible uses for 
PRAs under the bill included “job training, childcare, transportation, relocation, career 
counseling, computer classes, and housing aid.”6  On November 1, 2004, U.S. Secretary 
of Labor Elaine L. Chao “announced a $9 million demonstration project for states 
interested in Personal Reemployment Accounts.”7  Although a maximum of nine states 
will be allowed to participate in the pilot program, the program in most other respects 
will be similar to the initial Bush administration proposal.8 
Given heightened unemployment in recent years, at first blush it may be difficult 
to find fault with a proposal that puts money in the hands of unemployed workers and has 
as its goal facilitating the training and reemployment of those workers.  While the 
objectives of the PRA proposal in this respect seem admirable, the structure of the 
program is out of synch with current economic realities.  The rise in recent years of long-
term unemployment (i.e., structural unemployment9) means that even workers who are 
                                                                                                                                                 
Quickly, http://www.doleta.gov/reemployment/Reemployment_index.cfm, accessed Aug. 27, 2004 
[hereinafter ETA, Personal Reemployment Accounts]. 
4 McGuireWoods, LLP, & Fortney, Scott, LLC, Under the Capitol Dome, 1:11 Fed. Emp. L. Insider 4 
(2004) [hereinafter Under the Capital Dome]. 
5 Id.  “The bill, H.R. 444, sponsored by Representative John Porter (R-Nevada), would allow demonstration 
moneys generated under the Workforce Investment Act to be used by states and local workforce investment 
boards” in administering the accounts.  Id. 
6 Id. 
7 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, News Release, Nov. 1, 2004, 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/eta/ETA20041912.htm, accessed Nov. 1, 2004 [hereinafter USDOL 
News Release]. 
8 Id.  For a more detailed explanation of the PRA proposal, see Paul T. Decker & Irma Perez-Johnson, 
Personal Reemployment Accounts: How Would They Work?, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Jan. 2004, 
no. 2; ETA, Personal Reemployment Accounts, supra note 3. 
9 “[S]tructural unemployment refers to a permanent loss of the old job and difficulty in finding a new job.”  
Duane E. Leigh, “The Role of Unemployment Insurance in Addressing Structural Unemployment: Lessons 
from Other Nations,” in LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT POLICIES, Laurie 
J. Bassi & Stephen A. Woodbury, eds., 187, 188 (2000). 
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willing and eager to find new work will often have difficulty doing so, particularly in 
industries where qualified job seekers far outnumber job openings.  For workers only 
qualified for work in such industries, the likelihood of finding a new job that supports 
their previous standard of living may be increased significantly by acquiring skills 
through training in order to be able to work in a new industry.  The PRA program, while 
in theory providing resources for job training, discourages using account funds for that 
purpose by focusing recipients instead on immediate returns to work through the use of 
reemployment bonuses and by failing to account for other obstacles to training inherent 
in the current UI system. 
This comment will address the ways in which the current PRA proposal is 
inefficient as a response to long-term unemployment because it underemphasizes the 
important role that training plays in effective reemployment services.  Part II will review 
the historical objectives of the UI system and discuss how two of those objectives – 
promoting reemployment and preventing downward mobility – fare under the current 
system.  Part III describes the ways in which the PRA proposal, while designed to more 
effectively meet the goals of promoting reemployment and preventing downward 
mobility, favors immediate reemployment and discourages some activities (e.g., training) 
that could lead to more efficient job matches in the future.  Part IV discusses alternatives 
to the PRA proposal and recommends an approach that retains the fundamental design of 
the current proposal but better balances the current incentives for immediate 
reemployment with incentives to accept training opportunities that may be in workers’ 
long-term interests. 
II. Objectives of Unemployment Insurance 
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A. Providing Stabilization for Workers and the Economy 
The current federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system was instituted 
under the Social Security Act of 1935.  While the Social Security Act has no purpose 
statement, a “declaration of policy” recommended by the 1936 United States Social 
Security Board explained that “the goal of unemployment insurance was to stem the 
‘menace to the health, welfare and morals’ caused by unemployment-related economic 
insecurity.”10  The Committee on Economic Security, which was established by President 
Roosevelt in 1934 and which recommended the establishment of a national 
unemployment insurance system, provided more specific guidance regarding the 
purposes of such a system.  The Committee identified three purposes of UI: “to provide 
some measure of economic stability for the unemployed worker, to stabilize the 
employment of individual employers by providing a lower tax rate for employers who 
laid off fewer workers, and to minimize recessions by maintaining purchasing power.”11 
UI provides stabilization for unemployed workers and for the economy during 
times of recession by providing short-term (usually 26 weeks) support to unemployed 
workers in the form of benefit payments.12  For workers, UI benefits increase stability in 
two ways.  First, benefit payments are designed to provide short-term stability through 
                                                 
10 Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV. 335, 341 (2001) 
(citation omitted) (quoting the declaration). 
11 Lucy A. Williams & Margaret Y.K. Woo, The “Worthy” Unemployed: Societal Stratification and 
Unemployment Insurance Programs in China and the United States, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 457, 
478-79 (1995).  Of these at times competing goals, “the greatest emphasis appears to have been on the 
alleviation of hardship to the unemployed worker.”  Id. at 479 n.98 (citation omitted).  The second purpose, 
relating to stabilizing the employment of individual employers, will not be discussed in this comment. 
12 Id. at 480.  It is important to note the relationship between individual and economic benefits in UI.  
While UI payments are received by individual workers, the benefits of such payments accrue to not only 
the individuals but the economy at large.  “Unemployment insurance allows workers time to look for jobs 
that match their education and training, and it supports families and communities during hard times, all of 
which lead to a more productive economy.”  Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse 
Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 388 (2003).  For a discussion of the individual and 
broader societal benefits of increased training in the PRA context, see Section IV-C. 
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partial income replacement while unemployed workers transition between jobs (or wait to 
be rehired by their former employers).13  While these benefit payments are intended to 
help workers maintain an accustomed standard of living, their success in this respect is 
limited, since payment levels are typically set at only about 50 percent of workers’ 
normal salary levels.14  Second, benefit payments enable unemployed workers to conduct 
more extensive work searches without being forced to accept the first immediately 
available job in order to pay for food or other expenses.  Thus, UI promotes long-term 
stability for workers by allowing them to be somewhat selective and find work without an 
accompanying reduction in their wages and standard of living.15 
The payment of UI benefits provides stabilization for the economy by bolstering 
spending during times of recession.  This kind of economic stabilization has long been 
considered one of the primary purposes of unemployment insurance.16  According to 
Kenneth Casebeer,  
Congress viewed unemployment insurance payments as a means of exerting an 
influence upon the stabilization of industry.  “Their only distinguishing feature is 
that they will be specially earmarked for the use of the unemployed at the very 
times when it is best for business that they should be so used.”  Early payment of 
insurance benefits serves to prevent a decline in the purchasing power of the 
                                                 
13 UI was originally designed to bridge the period between jobs for workers experiencing temporary 
layoffs.  However, permanent layoffs have risen significantly since the inception of the UI system, and 
short-term benefits are often not sufficient to bridge the longer unemployment spells associated with long-
term unemployment.  Kenneth M. Casebeer, “Unemployment Insurance: American Social Wage, Labor 
Organization and Legal Ideology,” 35 B.C. L. Rev. 259, 342 (1994). 
14 Williams & Woo, supra note 11, at 483. 
15 While the objective of short-term stability is clearly defined in the UI literature, there is more debate 
about the role of UI in promoting job matching and preventing downward mobility.  For a discussion of this 
topic, see infra Section II-C. 
16 Casebeer, supra note 13, at 335. 
Davidson 
 6
unemployed, which in turn serves to aid industries producing goods and 
services.17 
 The effectiveness of UI as a stabilizer for unemployed workers and the economy 
has been undermined by rising long-term unemployment.  Workers are increasingly more 
likely to exhaust their benefits before finding another job, resulting in a mere postponing 
of the destabilizing impacts on workers and the economy as a whole.  Because UI 
provides workers with benefits during periods of unemployment but does little to 
counteract long-term unemployment, its effectiveness as a long-term stabilizer is limited 
in today’s economy. 
B. Promoting Reemployment 
Some have argued that another goal of the UI system is to facilitate 
reemployment.18  This contention is not without support.  The Committee on Economic 
Security, established by President Roosevelt “in 1934 with the mandate to ‘study 
problems relating to the economic security of individuals’ and to recommend government 
policies that would ‘promote greater economic security[,]’ . . . found that ‘the first 
objective in a program [to support that goal] must be maximum employment.’”19  In 
addition, one could argue that UI promotes reemployment by keeping large numbers of 
unemployed workers off of the welfare rolls by providing temporary wage replacement.  
Also, because UI recipients are required to look for work and know that their benefit 
payments will stop at a definite point in time, they may feel a greater motivation to find 
work. 
                                                 
17 Id. at 320 (citation omitted) (quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger). 
18 Williams & Woo, supra note 11, at 484. 
19 Id. at 478. 
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Despite these arguments and the Committee on Economic Security’s early 
declaration of policy, studies of the actual impacts of UI on reemployment suggest that 
unemployed workers receiving UI benefits on average experience longer periods of 
unemployment than unemployed workers who receive no benefits.20  This result should 
not be surprising, given that UI minimizes the harm of unemployment by allowing the 
unemployed individual to remain unemployed for a short time without being forced back 
into the labor force at a significantly lower wage.  While it might be inaccurate to say that 
the purpose of UI is to prolong unemployment, UI does reduce the cost to the individual 
of being temporarily unemployed.  This is hardly a surprise effect of UI.  Indeed, one 
might argue that a primary purpose of UI is to allow recipients to remain unemployed for 
a longer time than if they were not receiving benefits, thus facilitating a better match 
between the claimant’s skills and prior wages and the skills and wages of the job sought. 
In this respect, a longer period of unemployment that leads to a higher paying job and 
more efficient match may be better for the individual and the economy than a shorter 
period of unemployment that results in a lower standard of living for the individual and a 
loss of productive skills.21   
Regardless of whether promoting speedier reemployment was an original 
objective of the UI system, many today feel that the system should do more to promote 
this purpose.  Some critics of the current UI system do not accept the job matching 
argument and feel that UI subsidizes unemployment and discourages recipients from 
                                                 
20 Walter A. Corson & Robert G. Spiegelman, “Introduction and Background of the Reemployment Bonus 
Experiments,” in PHILIP K. ROBINS & ROBERT G. SPIEGELMAN, eds., REEMPLOYMENT 
BONUSES IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM: EVIDENCE FROM THREE FIELD 
EXPERIMENTS 1, 6 (2001). 
21 See infra Section II-C, which discusses matching as a purpose of the UI system. 
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actively seeking work.22  While not all who subscribe to this disincentive view of UI 
would recommend eliminating UI altogether, many feel that the system could be 
improved by providing incentives for unemployed individuals to return to work more 
quickly.  The reemployment bonuses available under PRAs are an example of such an 
incentive.   
 In theory, providing a reemployment bonus increases the cost to the worker of 
remaining unemployed and causes a reduction in the reservation wage (i.e., the wage at 
which the worker is willing to accept employment), thereby increasing the likelihood that 
the worker will accept a particular job offer.23  The idea of offering a cash reemployment 
bonus to encourage a swifter return to work predates the current PRA proposal.  Between 
1984 and 1989, reemployment bonus experiments “designed to counteract the 
reemployment disincentives inherent in UI” were conducted in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington.24  In terms of reducing UI system costs, the success of such experiments 
was limited.  While the Illinois experiment provided evidence that the provision of 
reemployment bonuses could shorten the average period of unemployment and thus result 
in a net savings to the UI system (i.e., for each dollar spent on the bonuses, two dollars 
                                                 
22 See generally Decker, supra note 2, at 286-98 (discussing theory behind disincentive view of UI and 
relevant studies).   
23 Walter A. Corson and Robert G. Spiegelman describe the theoretical underpinnings of reemployment 
bonuses as follows: 
The expectation that an offer of a bonus would lead to reduced unemployment has theoretic roots 
in contemporary job-search theory, which developed the concept of an optimal search strategy for 
unemployed workers.  McCall (1965) described an optimal search rule for job seekers as involving 
a sequential process in which the worker decides whether or not to continue searching after 
obtaining each wage offer.  In this context, a bonus offer to find a job within a specified time 
raises the cost of rejecting a given job offer, thereby reducing the reservation wage and increasing 
the likelihood of accepting any particular job offer (see Davidson 1990, pp. 15-17).  This theory, 
in conjunction with job matching theory, would hold that reducing the reservation wage would not 
necessarily reduce the offered wage because the higher reservation wage was unrealistic in terms 
of job offers available.  Thus, the critical questions to be answered for a potential bonus offer 
program are 1) will it reduce unemployment and 2) will the reduction affect job matches? 
Supra note 20, at 7. 
24 Decker, supra note 2, at 305. 
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were saved that would have been spent on UI benefits), the Pennsylvania and Washington 
experiments resulted in overall losses to the UI system (i.e., the bonuses plus costs of 
administering the program exceeded the reduction in UI benefit payments).25  These 
experiments led to the conclusion “that reemployment bonuses are unlikely to be a cost-
effective method for speeding reemployment, at least from the standpoint of the UI 
system.”26  Despite these findings, reemployment bonuses have remained a topic of 
political discussion.  The Reemployment Act of 1994, which did not receive 
Congressional approval, would have allowed states to offer reemployment bonuses to UI 
claimants who find new employment quickly.27 
 Focusing on the effectiveness of reemployment bonuses in reducing 
unemployment spells and UI system costs distracts from a more fundamental question: 
does UI discourage recipients from actively seeking and accepting suitable employment?  
If not, reemployment bonuses are unnecessary, because they provide an incentive where 
none is needed and may actually result in UI recipients accepting unsuitable work, thus 
harming their long-term interests in order to qualify for a short-term benefit. 
  Adherents to the disincentive view of UI cite evidence suggesting that the length 
of unemployment benefits is positively related to long-term unemployment.28  The 
temptation exists to attribute this result to problems of moral hazard within the insurance 
context.  “‘Moral hazard’ refers to the change in incentives that can result from insurance 
protection.”29  Because UI reduces the cost to the individual of remaining unemployed 
(i.e., pays the individual for being jobless), moral hazard suggests that UI reduces the 
                                                 
25 Id. at 306. 
26 Id. 
27 See Corson & Decker, supra note 2, at 16; Leigh, supra note 9, at 189. 
28 Leigh, supra note 9, at 209 (citing several studies).  
29 Baker, supra note 12, at 373. 
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incentive for the individual to return to work.  Counteracting incentives, such as 
reemployment bonuses, are useful in minimizing these deterrent effects and thereby 
neutralizing outside influences on the individual’s decision about when and how to 
reenter the labor market.30 
While moral hazard is a potential problem in any system that insures against 
preventable losses,31 some overestimate the impacts of moral hazard problems in the UI 
context by giving inadequate attention to the preexisting incentives for UI recipients to 
return to work.  According to Lee Anne Fennell, there are several methods for controlling 
moral hazard in the insurance context, including “monitoring, coverage conditions, 
coverage limits, . . . partial coverage, and norms.”32  The UI system currently utilizes 
most or all of these methods.  Characteristics of the UI system that control moral hazard 
by curbing disincentives to return to work include limited duration of benefits (usually 26 
weeks),33 the fact that income replacement is only partial,34 and eligibility requirements 
regarding involuntary unemployment, history of labor force attachment, and work search 
and availability.35  Because recipients are required to have a history of stable 
employment, are not unemployed by choice, and receive benefits that are temporary and 
significantly lower than the wages to which they are accustomed, it is reasonable to 
assume that most recipients want to reenter the labor force and are not trying to postpone 
reemployment.  Instead of trying to affect the incentives of UI recipients who are already 
                                                 
30 See Lee Anne Fennell, Relative Burdens: Family Ties and the Safety Net, 45 WILLIAM & MARY L. 
REV. 1453, 1504-06, 1505 n.130 (2004) (discussing moral hazard in the insurance context, as well as the 
provision of reemployment bonuses as a potential cost-limiting action). 
31 Id. at 1504. 
32 Id. at 1505. 
33 Williams & Woo, supra note 11, at 480. 
34 “The historical standard for defining benefit levels has been a 50% wage replacement. . . .  [W]hether 
that level is sufficient to cover ‘necessary expenses’ has been questioned.”  Id. at 483-84. 
35 States are required to have monitoring systems in place to ensure that UI recipients are actively seeking 
work.  Id. at 504. 
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willing and eager to return to work, the UI system can better promote reemployment by 
providing additional resources to help recipients qualify for and find work. 
Because most workers do not require an additional incentive to return to work, 
providing reemployment bonuses to unemployed workers may cause more problems than 
they solve.  A frequent criticism of reemployment bonuses has been that offering a bonus 
will not significantly affect rates of employment, since reemployment bonuses do not 
create new jobs.  According to Decker, “If all unemployed workers generally compete for 
a limited number of job vacancies, claimants who find positions more quickly because 
they receive a bonus offer may displace other unemployed workers from these jobs.”36  
While this may not be a bad thing in itself, it is hardly the result that proponents of 
reemployment bonuses might expect. 
A more problematic result of introducing bonuses into a system that already 
balances reemployment incentives and disincentives may be the skewing of incentives in 
ways that are detrimental to the long-term interests of both individuals and society.  
According to Fennell, exerting too much control in the insurance context can cause 
problems:   
There is another side to the controllability of costs. . . .  Some things that families might 
do to control costs are not in the long-term interests of either the dependent person or the 
caretaker.  In these cases, creating or maintaining incentives towards cost control actually 
could prove counterproductive.  To put this another way, there is a potential silver lining 
to what we normally think of as ‘moral hazard.’  Sometimes people make decisions that 
are normatively better when they are not given an incentive to control costs.  In these 
                                                 
36 Decker, supra note 2, at 306. 
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cases, public provision of assistance would not create a distortion against controlling 
costs, but rather would work to correct a distortion in favor of controlling costs.37 
To put this in the context of UI, unemployed individuals may be able to make 
decisions that are in their own (and often society’s) best interests when they are not given 
an incentive (in this case, a reemployment bonus) to control costs.  This reflects the 
earlier point that UI promotes stability by allowing workers to make decisions that are in 
their best interests without being forced to accept work beneath their previous wages and 
skill levels in order to make ends meet.  By offering a reemployment bonus, the 
government may be taking workers’ eyes off of their long-term interests and focusing 
their gaze instead on a short-term reward.  This is one way in which the goal of 
promoting reemployment in the UI system is often at odds with the goal of facilitating 
better job matching and preventing downward mobility.  As discussed in the next section, 
meeting the latter goal may mean allowing individuals to pursue a course that does not 
lead to immediate reemployment.  
 
C. Preventing Downward Mobility and Facilitating Better Job Matching 
As mentioned previously, UI benefits make it possible for recipients to remain 
unemployed longer than they could without the receipt of such benefits.  This gives 
recipients the opportunity to conduct more extensive job searches and find work that 
effectively utilizes their current skills and experience and that pays wages that will allow 
                                                 
37 Fennell, supra note 30, at 1506. 
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them to maintain a standard of living to which they are accustomed.  Another way of 
saying this is that UI facilitates job matching and prevents downward mobility.38 
Preventing downward mobility and facilitating better job matching have been 
described as important (if not primary) purposes of the UI system.  “‘Maximum 
utilization of a worker’s skills and experience [i.e., job matching] is a recognized goal of 
the unemployment compensation system.’”39  Other scholars have noted that “the very 
premise of unemployment insurance is the maintenance of economic stability in the 
unemployed worker’s life [i.e., the prevention downward mobility] until she is able to 
find another job.”40 
Recognition of these objectives has been incorporated into the current UI system 
in the form of a limitation placed on the requirement that UI recipients be available for 
work.  Benefit recipients are not expected to accept work outside their field of previous 
employment or that would lead to a significant reduction in wages or the underutilization 
of their skills.41  Thus, the recipient need not be available for any work opportunities, 
only for those that would constitute “suitable” work. However, the longer the recipient 
remains unemployed without finding “suitable” work, the more this limitation is relaxed 
to include work at a lower wage or outside the individual’s field of expertise.42   
                                                 
38 While facilitating job matching and preventing downward mobility are distinct goals, they are related, 
and this comment often refers to them interchangeably.  However, it should be noted that these goals may 
at times conflict (e.g., a worker may accept a job that is an efficient use of her skills but pays substantially 
less than her previous job).  In such cases, deciding which goal is preferable can be tricky and involves 
weighing benefits to society against benefits to the individual.  This discussion is beyond the scope of this 
comment.  In passages of this comment where it is unclear which of the goals is being addressed, the reader 
should assume that the goal being addressed is preventing downward mobility, as this seems to be most 
relevant to the concerns of individual workers. 
39 Casebeer, supra note 13, at 327 (citation omitted) (quoting Vermont Supreme Court in In re Potvin). 
40 Williams & Woo, supra note 11, at 482. 
41 2 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 350, 396 (2d ed. 1999). 
42 Id. at 398-99. 
Davidson 
 14
Unfortunately, the rise in long-term unemployment since the inception of the UI 
system has made downward mobility a reality for many workers.  Studies have shown 
that the proportion of unemployed workers on temporary layoffs is decreasing, 
suggesting that a higher proportion of workers are facing permanent layoffs.43  In 
addition, workers are staying unemployed for longer periods of time than before.  The 
percentage of workers unemployed for at least 15 weeks has increased steadily over 
several decades.44  When workers do find work, it is often at wages significantly lower 
than those of their previous job.  According to one study, “One to three years after losing 
their jobs, half [of permanently laid-off workers] were either not working or had new jobs 
with weekly earnings of less than 80% of their prelayoff earnings.”45  In addition, several 
studies showed that “five years after their job loss, the wages of dislocated [i.e., 
permanently laid-off] workers . . . were still about 15% lower than their predislocation 
levels. . . .  Unemployment insurance claimants who exhaust their benefits have 
especially high earnings losses.”46  These statistics illustrate that the goals of promoting 
job matching and preventing downward mobility are not being realized for many (if not 
most) unemployed workers. 
The current UI system is poorly suited to deal with the rise in long-term 
unemployment.  Although the federal government may extend the duration of UI benefits 
during times of recession,47 the standard benefit term is 26 weeks and “was designed to 
                                                 
43 Corson & Decker, supra note 2, at 7. 
44 Id. at 7-8. 
45 Id. at 5. 
46 Id. at 5-7. 
47 In response to the post-September 11 recession, Congress enacted the Job Creation and Worker 
Assistance Act of 2002, which temporarily extended the standard UI benefit period from 26 weeks to 39 
weeks.  See Robert W. Oast, Jr., Treading Water in Slow Economic Times and Recovering from Disaster: 
The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, 34 URB. LAW. 927, 932 (2002). 
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meet the cyclical unemployment problems of industrial society.”48  UI benefit payments 
are intended to bridge the period between jobs for workers experiencing temporary 
layoffs and are “premised on the assumption that workers can find work if they simply 
try.”49  As a result, they are inadequate for addressing lengthened unemployment spells 
and the difficulties today’s workers face in finding jobs that match their skills and prior 
wages. 
While the UI system as currently constituted is not equipped to deal with long-
term unemployment, it still serves an important role in providing at least temporary 
support to unemployed workers.  Eliminating UI completely would likely do more harm 
than good.  Instead, UI should be restructured or additional programs instituted that 
would help UI recipients overcome the effects of long-term unemployment.  A clue as to 
how this could be accomplished is found in the following statement by William Norwood 
regarding the current UI system: 
“One of the things that I began to realize is that the early concept of availability for work 
had somehow gotten distorted into instant availability. . . .  In some instances, what we 
really ought to have been doing was encouraging people to be entering training, rather 
than to be immediately available for the first job that came along.  To upgrade their skills, 
take advantage of the time between jobs to move up in the occupational hierarchy.”50 
The ease with which UI recipients may find new work depends in large part on 
possessing the skills that are valued by employers in today’s postindustrial economy.  
Thus, training is often critical to overcoming the effects of long-term unemployment.  
This is highlighted by the fact that the unemployed workers with the largest reductions in 
                                                 
48 Casebeer, supra note 13, at 342. 
49 Williams & Woo, supra note 11, at 483. 
50 Casebeer, supra note 13, at 343. 
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earnings typically include those with the least education.51  On the other hand, job growth 
in the next ten years is expected to be most significant in high-skill industries, such as 
information technology, health services, and professional and business services, while the 
manufacturing industry is expected to experience a reduction in overall jobs.52  
According to the White House webpage, “Two-thirds of America’s economic growth in 
the 1990s resulted from the introduction of new technologies – and 60% of the new jobs 
of the 21st century require post-secondary education held by only one-third of America’s 
workforce.”53 
Unfortunately, receiving the training required for many of these new jobs is 
difficult for most UI recipients.  Typically, UI recipients rely on their benefit payments 
for support and do not have additional financial resources to use for training.  To make 
matters worse, the current UI system discourages training as an alternative to immediate 
reemployment.  For example, the UI system does not permit UI trust funds to be used for 
retraining costs.54  Federal and state job training programs are in effect, but they “are 
generally poorly funded, and serve only a small percentage of the eligible population.”55  
In addition, while these programs on their face provide resources to unemployed workers, 
administrative and other problems have prevented many of the funds from reaching the 
workers most in need of them.56  Although UI recipients are technically “eligible to 
participate in training offered through programs operating under the authority of the 
Economic Dislocated Worker Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) Act . . . these services 
                                                 
51 Corson & Decker, supra note 2, at 5. 
52 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Career Guide to Industries, Overview and 
Outlook,” http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/indchar.htm, accessed November 1, 2004. 
53 The White House, “Better Training for Better Jobs,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/print/20040405-7.html, accessed November 1, 2004. 
54 Williams & Woo, supra note 11, at 484. 
55 Id. 
56 “Better Training for Better Jobs,” supra note 53. 
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have not been closely coordinated with UI and [the Employment Service], so few UI 
claimants have actually participated in the available training opportunities.”57  Overall, 
only a small percentage of UI recipients or exhaustees benefit from current programs 
designed to provide job search assistance and training.58 
Another way that the UI system discourages training is through the requirement 
that claimants be available for work.  Historically, recipients of UI involved in long-term 
training programs were likely to be found ineligible for benefits on the premise that they 
were not available for work.59  “In 1970, the federal unemployment insurance statute was 
amended to prohibit states from denying unemployment insurance benefits to 
unemployed workers in training for being unavailable for work, refusing to take suitable 
work, or failing to look for work, if the training was approved by the state agency.”60  
However, states were given autonomy “to determine what training is appropriate for a 
claimant,” as well as “what criteria are established for approval of training for an 
individual.”61  In the intervening years, the change has had little effect, since “states have 
utilized the training approval mechanism infrequently, and the fund for retraining 
programs has remained inadequate.”62  While many policymakers recognize the increased 
need for training among the unemployed,63 efforts to make more training resources 
available to UI recipients have been largely ineffective. 
                                                 
57 Corson & Decker, supra note 2, at 4. 
58 See id. at 12-13. 
59 Williams & Woo, supra note 11, at 484. 
60 Id. 
61 Gerald Hildebrand, Federal Law Requirements for the Federal-State Unemployment Compensation 
System: Interpretation and Application, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527, 550 (1996) (citation omitted) 
(citing USDOL, 1970 Draft Legislation). 
62 Williams & Woo, supra note 11, at 484. 
63 According to former U.S. Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan, UI laws  
discourage workers from seeking jobs in new industries which may pay a lower initial wage but 
which may hold the possibility of rewarding new careers.  This result simply does not make sense, 
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The current UI system, by discouraging training, is ineffective in preventing 
downward mobility.  Facilitating the training of unemployed workers to qualify them for 
jobs in different industries at a similar or better standard of living would seem to be a 
good alternative to “work at a lesser skill and lower wages.”64  Inasmuch as PRAs 
provide funds for training and more intensive job searches, they recognize a failing in the 
current system and are onto something good.  However, this is only one aspect of the 
current PRA proposal, which also recommends providing bonuses as incentives for 
reemployment.  The next section addresses the training and reemployment aspects of the 
PRA proposal and how effective they are as responses to the perceived shortcomings of 
the UI system. 
 
 
 
III. The Bonus/Training Conflict in the PRA Proposal 
A. PRAs and Choice 
Despite the UI system’s purported goals of promoting reemployment and 
preventing downward mobility, in at least some regards the system is ineffective in 
achieving these ends.  The PRA proposal seems to focus on these two goals in ways that 
are designed to provide what is missing (or fix what is not working) in the current UI 
system.  
                                                                                                                                                 
either for the individual worker or the economy as a whole.  With the growth of new industries 
and declining employment in old industries, workers must be challenged to adjust their lives and 
their careers to meet changing conditions. 
Casebeer, supra note 13, at 333-34 (citation omitted).  
64 Id. at 324. 
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The reemployment bonus aspect of the PRA proposal is designed to speed up the 
reemployment process for UI recipients, who have been shown to have longer average 
unemployment spells than unemployed workers who do not receive UI.65  The bonus is 
available only to those PRA recipients who accept a full-time job within the first 13 
weeks of receiving UI benefits.66  Thus, the bonus would provide recipients with an 
incentive for more rapid reemployment.  The size of the bonus (and consequently the 
incentive) would vary based on the amount remaining in the individual account (which 
would generally have a starting balance of $3,000).67  Thus, recipients who use PRA 
funds for other activities related to work search or training stand to receive a smaller 
bonus than recipients who do not engage in these other activities.  Sixty percent of the 
bonus would be payable immediately upon acceptance of full-time work, with the 
remaining forty percent payable after six months of employment.68 
In addition to providing a bonus connected to the speed of reemployment, PRAs 
may encourage more effective job placement by making funds available for work search 
or training.  In general, the accounts would be administered through state One-Stop 
Career Centers and could be used for a number of activities related to job training and 
work search, including child care and transportation.69  To monitor use of the funds, 
recipients would receive vouchers instead of cash, which could then be used “to purchase 
                                                 
65 Corson & Spiegelman, supra note 20, at 6. 
66 Decker & Perez-Johnson, supra note 8. 
67 Id.  States would determine the size of the individual accounts (up to $3,000) and would have flexibility 
in designing the program.  Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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the full range of services offered by One-Stop Career Centers.”70  PRA recipients would 
have 12 months to use the funds.71 
While the PRA proposal tries to address the failures of the current UI system in 
promoting reemployment and preventing downward mobility, it also brings into sharp 
focus the potential conflicts between these two goals.72  One conflict may arise when a 
worker’s current skill set is no longer useful in securing adequate employment, either 
because jobs for which that worker is qualified are in short supply or would lead to a 
much lower standard of living.  In this case, focusing on reemployment will likely lead to 
downward mobility and an inefficient match between the worker’s qualifications and the 
new job.  On the other hand, finding a job that supports the worker’s accustomed 
standard of living will often involve enrolling the worker in a course of training to update 
her skills.  While an appropriate step to preventing downward mobility, pursuing such 
training opportunities does not usually lead to immediate reemployment. 
The fact that the goals of rapid reemployment and job matching may conflict in 
some respects does not necessarily mean that the combination of these goals within the 
PRA proposal is fatal to the effectiveness of PRAs.  Because PRA recipients may choose 
between using the accounts for a more extensive job search or accepting a present 
opportunity and receiving the bonus, the program theoretically empowers recipients to 
make the choice that best suits their current needs and long-term interests.  PRA 
                                                 
70 Id.  It is unclear to what extent PRA recipients would be able to use the accounts to purchase training and 
other services from the marketplace rather than One-Stop Career Centers.  Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao 
has suggested that PRA recipients could purchase services from the marketplace.  USDOL News Release, 
supra note 7.   Decker & Perez-Johnson suggest that PRA recipients would be given more control and 
flexibility in their use of resources than are currently granted to other customers of One-Stop Career 
Centers.  Decker & Perez-Johnson, supra note 8. 
71 Decker & Perez-Johnson, supra note 8. 
72 Of course, these goals are not always conflicting and may work together in some instances (e.g., in 
helping a worker to find the best immediately available job). 
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proponents have repeatedly emphasized how the accounts would incorporate this element 
of personal choice.  As Labor Secretary Chao has said,  
Personal Reemployment Accounts will empower unemployed and dislocated workers 
with more control over selecting their own training and career paths.  It’s part of the 
President’s commitment to building an ownership society.  That’s simply another way of 
saying that we trust individual workers to know what training courses to choose and to 
decide what job options they prefer.73  
President Bush has also asserted that workers would be able to decide how to use their 
accounts.74  In reality, though, this ability to choose is limited under the current PRA 
proposal. 
The most obvious and perhaps most important limitation is that the accounts are 
only to be used for activities related to job search or training.75  In this respect, PRA 
recipients have far less autonomy with the use of those funds than UI recipients have with 
the use of UI benefits (although in most cases PRA recipients will receive UI benefits at 
the same time, at least until those benefits expire).  One could reasonably suppose that 
One-Stop Career Centers, which would administer the accounts, would not defer to a 
recipient’s decision to use the account to pay for a big screen television, as this would fall 
outside the scope of uses related to job search or training.  PRAs are available for a wide 
enough range of services, though, that recipients would seemingly not be to restricted in 
their use of the accounts.  PRA recipients may even be able to use the accounts to pay for 
some activities only tangentially related to job search and training, such as housing and 
                                                 
73 USDOL News Release, supra note 7. 
74 See George W. Bush, Remarks on Employment Training at Northern Virginia Community College (June 
17, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030617-3.html).  
75 See Decker & Perez-Johnson, supra note 8. 
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childcare.76  Also, once the recipient has obtained a job she receives the remainder of the 
account in cash,77 suggesting that there would then be no restrictions on its use. 
Because the accounts would be administered through One-Stop Career Centers, 
use of the accounts may also be limited by the services available through those centers.  It 
remains to be seen whether services would also be available from the private sector, 
although according to a Department of Labor news release, PRAs could be used “to 
purchase job training and supportive services and products from either the marketplace or 
public One-Stop Career Centers.”78  Of course, such flexibility is only theoretical at this 
early stage of the program.  It remains to be seen how much autonomy recipients will 
have when the accounts are actually administered. 
There is a more subtle but potentially powerful influence affecting the autonomy 
of PRA recipients.  This lies in the powerful incentive PRAs provide for recipients to 
focus on short-term results (e.g., obtaining a job, perhaps at a lower reservation wage, in 
order to receive a bonus) instead of long-term opportunities (e.g., using the account for 
training, with a more uncertain result in terms of immediate job opportunities).  In other 
words, the PRA program, while providing funds for training and extensive work search, 
discourages use of those funds for purposes other than immediate reemployment.  Thus, 
PRAs do not maintain a balance between the goals of reemployment and preventing 
downward mobility.  This partiality for swift returns to work influences the choices of 
PRA recipients regarding use of the accounts, making it more difficult for them to make 
objective decisions that are in their long-term interests.  The next section addresses how 
this partiality is manifested in the current PRA proposal. 
                                                 
76 See Under the Capital Dome, supra note 4 (listing permissible uses of PRAs under 2004 House bill). 
77 See ETA, Personal Reemployment Accounts, supra note 3.   
78 USDOL News Release, supra note 7.   
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B. PRAs Discourage Job Training 
As discussed in Part II, reemployment bonuses may create a distortion in favor of 
speedy returns to work.  In theory, the provision of funds to be used for work search or 
training may help to correct this distortion, thus balancing incentives so the recipient can 
choose between returning to work or holding out for a better job, based primarily on what 
is in the individual’s (and often the economy’s) long-term interests.  However, other 
factors may complicate the decision making process for the individual. 
Under the current proposal, the reemployment bonus and job search/training 
funds come from the same small coffer, which might force the recipient in some cases to 
choose between receiving the bonus by accepting immediately available employment 
(potentially at a lower wage) or forgoing the bonus by using the account to finance a 
more extensive job search or course of training.  Thus, the current proposal increases the 
cost to the recipient of receiving training, because it means that she must give up a 
sizable cash bonus to do so.  While many recipients faced with this decision may choose 
to accept the first available job in order to receive the bonus, they might thereby sacrifice 
valuable training and future opportunities in the form of more stable or profitable 
employment. 
Another way in which the current proposal discourages the use of PRA funds for 
training purposes is by focusing recipients on short-term rather than long-term results.  
The best example of this is the 13-week reemployment deadline for those who would like 
to take advantage of the bonus option, which makes the focus for PRA recipients the 
speed of reemployment rather than the quality of employment.  In addition, the accounts 
themselves are only available to recipients for 12 months, which again might emphasize 
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short-term results over long-term stability.  This is particularly a problem if the desired 
course of training is longer than a year in duration or if the recipient must wait for a 
training program to begin. 
It remains to be seen whether One-Stop Career Centers, which would administer 
the program, will emphasize rapid reemployment over long-term training opportunities.  
It may be easier for PRA administrators to help recipients find work based on their 
current limited skill sets rather than looking for ways to expand such skill sets through 
training opportunities.  Focusing on immediately available jobs, even at reduced wages, 
may also be considered less risky than pursuing training programs with less certain 
employment outcomes.  However, by avoiding risk in this way, PRA recipients will 
likely limit their future opportunities and be less of a benefit to society, which often 
benefits from individual risk-taking and investment in the future. 
Finally, the obstacles to training already inherent in the UI system would also 
cause difficulties for those who want to use PRAs for training purposes. 79  Even with 
account funds available for training programs, PRA recipients may have trouble 
supporting themselves after their UI benefits expire.  This would limit the ability of 
recipients to engage in more extended training programs for acquiring certain marketable 
skills.  The current obstacles faced by federal and state job training programs could also 
limit the effectiveness of the PRA training option, since training coordinated through 
One-Stop Career Centers would likely involve such programs.  
Despite these disincentives, some recipients will probably choose to use the 
accounts for job search and training services.  By implementing the current PRA 
proposal, we may even see a net increase in job search assistance and training among UI 
                                                 
79 See supra Part II-C (discussing such obstacles). 
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recipients.  However, for this increase to be significant, and for PRA recipients to have 
greater control in using the accounts for their best interests, PRAs should provide more 
incentives for recipients to use the accounts for training purposes.  The next section 
discusses how providing such incentives will help benefit workers and society.  
C. PRAs Should Promote Job Training  
Given their name, it should not be surprising to anyone that Personal 
Reemployment Accounts focus mainly on promoting reemployment.  However, 
immediate reemployment is not always in the best interests of workers or society.  While 
job training is not always preferable to immediate reemployment, there are several 
reasons why PRAs should do more to promote job training.  To better understand these 
reasons, it may help to compare the benefits that workers and society can expect to 
receive from programs that promote reemployment and those that promote training. 
A seemingly obvious reason for promoting reemployment is to reduce the costs 
borne by state UI funds, several of which have been teetering on the verge of insolvency 
in recent years.80  However, reemployment bonuses have operated at a loss in some 
demonstration projects, and therefore may not be the most cost-effective way of speeding 
up the reemployment process.81  In addition, providing a bonus may have little effect on 
the overall employment level and instead only impact who receives work in industries 
with few job openings, rather than how many receive work.  Those receiving bonuses 
                                                 
80 See Nancy Vogel, Jobless Fund to Hit Employers, L.A. Times, December 15, 2003, at B1; Stephanie 
Simon, Aid to Jobless Devastating State Finances, L.A. Times, January 21, 2003, at A10. 
81 Decker, supra note 2, at 306; Corson & Decker, supra note 2, at 14.  According to Duane Leigh, 
“[E]stimated effects on weeks of UI receipt are about the same as those achieved, but at much lower cost, 
in demonstration projects testing the effectiveness of more closely monitoring work search behavior.”  
Supra note 9, at 210. 
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may merely be displacing the workers who would otherwise have received the jobs, 
resulting in little net benefit to society.82 
Promoting reemployment through reemployment bonuses may benefit individuals 
in some cases by motivating them to intensify their work search.  However, there are 
problems with the argument that workers need a bonus to incentivize them to return to 
work.83  Also, as discussed in Part II-C, long-term unemployment has led to an overall 
reduction in wages for dislocated workers, and trying to speed up the reemployment 
process might only exacerbate this problem.  Providing a bonus may create an incentive 
for workers to accept work not suited to their skills or at a lower reservation wage.84 
On the other hand, providing training so dislocated workers can acquire skills that 
are in demand and transition to industries with more job openings may increase their 
long-term job security.  This also benefits society by moving workers from highly 
saturated industries to industries where skilled workers are needed.  This could have the 
overall effect of decreasing unemployment.  Training programs also create skills that may 
benefit society, whereas reemployment bonuses may lead to the loss of skills if jobs that 
utilize a worker’s past experience and skills are not immediately available.  In addition, 
participation in training programs may help individuals qualify for jobs that provide 
wages comparable to or better than their previous wages.   
                                                 
82 See Decker, supra note 2, at 306; Carl Davidson & Stephen A. Woodbury, From Social Experiment to 
Program: The Reemployment Bonus, in PHILIP K. ROBINS & ROBERT G. SPIEGELMAN, eds., 
REEMPLOYMENT BONUSES IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM: EVIDENCE 
FROM THREE FIELD EXPERIMENTS 175, 195-98 (2001) (describing a study demonstrating the 
“crowding-out effects” of providing reemployment bonuses to a limited number of UI recipients). 
83 See supra Part II-B. 
84 At least one study suggests that providing reemployment bonuses does not adversely affect job matches.  
See Corson & Spiegelman, supra note 20, at 1.  However, as effective matching may be reduced by 
bonuses in individual situations (even if not in the aggregate), and as training programs may result in more 
long-term stability and opportunities (and thus potentially increase quality of job matches), PRAs should 
still balance incentives to accept a bonus with incentives to participate in training. 
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Another benefit of removing the obstacles to training in both PRAs and the 
current UI system is that it would give workers the opportunity to make decisions based 
on their long-term interests.  Rather than making it more costly for workers to focus on 
the long term (e.g., by denying them a bonus if they use funds for extended training 
programs), PRAs should help people overcome pre-existing incentives to act only in their 
short-term interests.  As illustrated above, pursuing training opportunities can be 
beneficial to both individuals and society.  Therefore, PRA recipients should be allowed 
to do just that.  
While in many situations training for the better future job is preferable to taking 
the immediately available job, I do not propose making it difficult for workers to choose 
to receive a bonus if this would be in their long-term interests.  I do propose balancing the 
incentives to choose immediately available work (and thereby a bonus) with incentives to 
receive training that would qualify the worker for better paying and more stable future 
employment.  Ultimately, the worker must decide what is good for her in terms of not 
only short-lived benefits but also long-term opportunities and stability.  However, 
because the current system makes it difficult to accept training opportunities (e.g., by 
giving workers no means of support while in training programs), this choice is taken 
away from workers.  The next section will recommend ways in which the PRA proposal 
can be altered to accommodate workers who would choose to participate in training 
programs if current obstacles to training were removed. 
 
IV. Recommendations 
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Adequate consideration of what measures could be taken to promote training in 
the PRA context would require additional research to determine the viability, cost, and 
long-term effectiveness of the various approaches.  However, the following 
recommendations may serve as a starting point for further research and discussion and 
provide insights into how PRAs could better promote training. 
A. Extend the Length of UI Benefits for Workers Involved in Training 
The greatest obstacle to unemployed workers using PRA funds for job training 
may be the difficulty those workers would face in supporting themselves and their 
families while participating in training programs.  Although all PRA recipients would 
also receive UI benefits, they likely would exhaust those benefits before completing an 
extensive training program.  This could have the effect of forcing PRA recipients into the 
labor force before their training is complete (especially since PRAs can only be used for 
work search or training purposes and not for subsistence purposes). 
The length of UI benefits should be extended for workers involved in approved 
training programs.85  This would remove the deterrent for PRA recipients to use their 
accounts for training and might actually encourage them to pursue a course of training 
when it would be in their long-term interests.  Program administrators, while allowing 
recipients to choose which courses of training to pursue, should monitor recipients’ 
involvement in training.  Such monitoring would ensure that recipients are not merely 
using the training option as a pretext for receiving more benefits. 
In addition, legislators and UI administrators should work to remove the other 
obstacles to training that exist in the current UI system.  Because only current or former 
                                                 
85 Leigh, while recommending caution in extending the length of UI benefits generally, suggests that in 
some circumstances benefits should be extended for “displaced workers engaged in long-term education 
and training programs.”  Leigh, supra note 9, at 209, 211-12. 
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UI recipients can qualify for PRAs,86 those who want to take advantage of the accounts 
for training must first qualify for UI benefits.  Although individuals involved in training 
can qualify for benefits under current law,87 states have rarely approved benefits for those 
involved in training programs.88  States should make it easier for those participating in 
training to receive UI by relaxing the criteria for approved training programs.  Also, the 
federal government should do more to enforce the requirement that states provide 
benefits to recipients involved in approved training programs (e.g., monitor state 
compliance or link state receipt of PRA funds to relaxing criteria for approved training). 
B. Offer Bonuses to Those Who Find Work After Receiving Training 
The current PRA proposal rewards those who quickly find and accept a new job 
but would not typically reward those who find a job after first completing training that 
qualifies them for employment in another trade or industry.  These imbalanced incentives 
do not reflect the value of training as an alternative that is beneficial to both individuals 
and society.  While retaining a bonus for those who find a job within the first 13 weeks of 
receiving benefits, PRAs should also provide a bonus for workers who find a job after 
completing an approved course of training.  One way of doing this would be to “stop the 
clock” for workers involved in training, so that the time spent in training would not count 
toward their 13 weeks.  This change would still promote reemployment after training is 
completed, because recipients would still be required to find a job before receiving a 
bonus. 
C. Create Separate Bonus Accounts 
                                                 
86 ETA, Personal Reemployment Accounts, supra note 3. 
87 See Williams & Woo, supra note 11, at 484. 
88 See Hildebrand, supra note 61, at 550. 
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Another problem with the current PRA proposal is that any money spent on job 
search or training reduces the amount available as a cash reemployment bonus.  
Legislators and program administrators should consider creating a separate bonus 
account, one that is not linked to the training account.  This would encourage workers to 
use their accounts for job search and training and discourage them from trying to increase 
their potential bonus by not using the accounts for other purposes.  However, due to 
limited government resources, creating a separate account would probably limit funds for 
work search and training by tying up available funds in a bonus account.  The potential 
benefits of this recommendation should therefore be carefully weighed against any 
negative impacts that might result from creating separate accounts.89 
D. Emphasize Training as an Alternative to Immediate Reemployment 
Finally, One-Stop Career Center personnel administering the accounts should be 
required to emphasize both alternatives (i.e., immediate reemployment and training) to 
PRA recipients.90  The purpose of this would not be to push recipients toward one 
approach or the other but to allow recipients to make an informed decision based on all of 
the available alternatives.  However, where the recipient is unsure of which path to 
pursue, administrators could provide information regarding current training opportunities, 
especially those that would qualify the recipient for jobs in growth industries.  The 
ultimate decision, though, should be made by the PRA recipient. 
V. Conclusion 
                                                 
89 Another way of encouraging PRA recipients to use the funds for work search and training would be to 
eliminate the bonus altogether, although this would likely be seen as undermining the goal of promoting 
reemployment.  Also, workers may use their funds more efficiently in qualifying for and finding new work 
when they know that they will receive a bonus if they succeed in finding a job. 
90 This is a less drastic approach that would likely be insufficient as a way of promoting training without 
the inclusion of one of the previous recommendations. 
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My purpose in writing this comment is not to suggest that PRAs should be used 
exclusively for providing long-term training to UI recipients.  I am suggesting a more 
balanced approach that would take into account the special needs of individual recipients 
and the social and individual benefits that could be derived in certain cases by pursuing 
long-term alternatives.  The recommendations described in the previous section would 
help enable PRA recipients to choose training instead of immediate reemployment, thus 
giving recipients more freedom to pursue the course of action that they feel promotes 
their best interests.  PRAs are a good idea to the extent that they will give UI recipients 
the means to make this choice without being compelled by financial necessity (or 
influenced by tempting, but ultimately insignificant, rewards) to settle for work with 
lower wages, less long-term stability, or fewer opportunities for advancement.  Giving 
this choice back to unemployed individuals is the key to the effectiveness of PRAs. 
